The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Innovation Performance of Chinese SMEs by Tang, Yao et al.
Bowdoin College 
Bowdoin Digital Commons 
Economics Department Working Paper Series Faculty Scholarship and Creative Work 
3-10-2013 
The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Innovation 
Performance of Chinese SMEs 
Yao Tang 
Bowdoin College, ytang@bowdoin.edu 
Daniel Shapiro 
Simon Fraser University, dshapiro@sfu.ca 
Miaojun Wang 
Zhejiang University, mervinjun2000@vip.sina.com 
Weiying Zhang 
Peking University, wyzhang@gsm.pku.edu.cn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/econpapers 
 Part of the Growth and Development Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tang, Yao; Shapiro, Daniel; Wang, Miaojun; and Zhang, Weiying, "The Effects of Corporate Governance on 
the Innovation Performance of Chinese SMEs" (2013). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 6. 
https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/econpapers/6 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship and Creative Work at 
Bowdoin Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Working Paper Series by 
an authorized administrator of Bowdoin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
mdoyle@bowdoin.edu. 
The Eﬀects of Corporate Governance on the Innovation
Performance of Chinese SMEs∗
Daniel Shapiro†, Yao Tang‡, Miaojun Wang§, and Weiying Zhang¶
March 10, 2013
Abstract
We investigate the degree to which corporate governance and ownership aﬀects the
innovation performance of ﬁrms in China with a particular focus on privately owned
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). We hypothesize that (1) board-related gover-
nance measures will enhance innovation because they improve monitoring and provide
access to necessary resources; (2) ownership concentration initially facilitates innova-
tion because large shareholders are more likely to commit to the long-term nature of
innovation, and have the incentive to monitor managers whose time horizon may be
shorter; however we argue that these eﬀects weaken as large shareholders becomes
entrenched at higher levels of concentration; and (3) hiring an external CEO will en-
hance innovation both by ensuring professional management of the company, and by
alleviating the entrenchment possibilities associated with large shareholders. These
hypotheses are tested using a unique sample of 370 mostly private and relatively small
Chinese ﬁrms in Zhejiang province, for the period 2004 to 2006. The results suggest
that for this sample, corporate governance and ownership aﬀect innovation activity
when measured by patenting activity, but not when measured by new product sales.
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Innovation is a key determinant of the competitive performance of both countries and
ﬁrms. Innovation is particularly important to emerging economies as they attempt to
raise productivity and incomes. As a large emerging economy, China recognizes the criti-
cal importance of innovation and has adopted policies to encourage innovative activities1,
including innovation by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Xinhua, 2013). Existing
evidence suggests that research and innovation activities have indeed increased substan-
tially over the past decade (Hu and Jeﬀerson, 2009; Huang, 2010)), and this has led
researchers to study the determinants of innovation in China, with a particular focus on
the eﬀects of R&D. Empirical studies (Jeﬀerson et al, 2006; Sun and Du, 2010) show that
in China, the R&D activities of ﬁrms have signiﬁcant and positive eﬀects on innovation
and other measures of ﬁrm performance. Researchers also ﬁnd that these positive eﬀects
are moderated by foreign knowledge access (Wang and Kafouros, 2009; Li et al, 2010a)
and incentive schemes (Chow and Liu, 2007; Zhang and Li, 2009; Li et al, 2010b). These
studies have not examined the impact of corporate governance on innovation in China.
However, there are studies from developed countries that focus on the eﬀects of
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the innovation outcomes of
ﬁrms (Casper and Matraves, 2003; Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2011; Belloc,
2012 provides a recent survey). This literature suggests a number of channels through
which corporate governance (including ownership identity and concentration; board size
and structure;) aﬀects innovation. First, large, long-term block owners are providers of
“patient capital”. For example, institutional investors with a long investment horizon
(Bushee, 1998; Eng and Shackell, 2001; Aghion et al, 2013) and owners who take control
through leveraged buyouts (Lerner et al, 2008; Ughetto, 2010) can enhance innovation
by providing long-term incentives to managers with career concerns, and by committing
1President Hu Jintao suggested that enhancing China’s ability in independent innovation is the core of
the country’s national development strategy Hu (2007).
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resources to innovation. Second, a concentrated owner has the incentive to monitor the
innovative eﬀorts of management and is more likely to commit to long-term objectives
like innovation (Hill and Snell, 1988; Baysinger et al, 1991). Third, an eﬀective board of
directors, including one that splits the positions of Chair and CEO can enhance innovation
by providing monitoring and access to outside resources (Hill and Snell, 1988; Lacetera,
2001).
It is not necessarily the case that corporate governance will aﬀect innovation in
emerging markets. In emerging economies where the general ﬁnancial and institutional
environments are less developed (La Porta et al, 2000; Heugens et al, 2009), there is evi-
dence suggesting that corporate governance practices perceived to be eﬀective in developed
countries may not be readily translated to emerging market economies (Claessens and Fan,
2002; Gibson et al, 2003; Heugens et al, 2009; Van Essen et al, 2012). In the particular
context of China, Chen et al (2011) ﬁnd that corporate governance practices recommended
by the OECD do not improve the ﬁnancial returns of Chinese ﬁrms.
At the same time, there is little research on the relation between corporate gover-
nance and innovation in emerging economies. Existing studies (Choi et al, 2011, 2012;
Chen et al, 2012) focus mainly on the eﬀects of ownership structure. An exception is Wu
(2008) who ﬁnds that managerial ownership and board competence have positive eﬀects
on the introduction of new products in Taiwan. The understanding of the general eﬀects
of corporate governance on innovation in emerging economies is therefore very limited.
In this paper, we address the research question: does corporate governance (in-
cluding ownership structure) contribute positively to innovation of SMEs in the emerging
country of China? In answering this question, we focus on the eﬀects of three internal
corporate governance mechanisms: the board of directors, ownership concentration, and
whether the CEO is an outsider. Mindful of the important features of SMEs in China,
which include concentrated ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999); restricted access to external
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resources; and the absence of the market for corporate control (Chen et al, 2011), we ap-
ply elements of standard agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), principal-principal
theory (Chen et al, 2011), and resource-dependence theory (Pfeﬀer and Salancik, 2003) in
the context of China to hypothesize that (1) a large board, the presence of independent
directors, and the presence of a supervisory board, contribute positively to innovation be-
cause they help the ﬁrm to improve monitoring and access to resources; and (2) innovation
ﬁrst increases with ownership concentration because such concentration allows the owner
to commit to long-run and risky innovation projects, but this positive eﬀect declines at
a higher levels of ownership concentration because the controlling shareholder becomes
entrenched and pursues other objectives ; and (3) an external CEO enhances innovation
by ensuring professional management of the company, thus mitigating the entrenchment
eﬀects of a controlling shareholder.
We test these hypotheses using a sample of 370 ﬁrms in Zhejiang province, China
between 2004 and 2006. As we discuss in more detail below, Zhejiang provinces is known
for its entrepreneurial culture, and the ﬁrms we study are primarily private, and relatively
small by Chinese standards. We use two measures for innovation, the number of new
patents between 2004 and 2006, and annual new product sales. The former measure will
include potential process and product innovations, while the latter covers actual product
innovations. Overall, we ﬁnd only limited evidence that corporate governance aﬀects
innovation performance, but the results do depend on the measure of innovation. In
particular, we ﬁnd little evidence that any corporate governance variable has a signiﬁcant
impact on innovation, measured by new product sales. However we do ﬁnd that some
dimensions of corporate governance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the number new invention
patents granted during the period studied. We ﬁnd that patent activity at ﬁrst increases
with ownership concentration but ultimately the positive eﬀect weakens, as hypothesized.
Similarly, we ﬁnd some evidence that the presence of external board members enhances
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patenting, but the existence of a supervisory board does not. The presence of an outsider
CEO has positive eﬀects on patenting only in the group of ﬁrms with positive counts of
new patents. The results indicate that the determinants of patenting, a more radical form
of innovation, are diﬀerent from those of new product sales, a more incremental form of
innovation.
Relative to the literature on corporate governance and innovation, our paper makes
three contributions. First, our study oﬀers a particular emphasis on the governance of
private SMEs, a topic rarely studied in the literature on corporate governance and/or cor-
porate governance in China. Many studies in either literature (Li et al, 2010a; Van Essen
et al, 2012) employ samples of listed ﬁrms and other large ﬁrms, often with signiﬁcant
state ownership. Compared to private SMEs, these ﬁrms have access to better ﬁnancing
and sometimes receive preferential support from the government. Because that the Chi-
nese government has recognized the economic importance of private SMEs (Xinhua, 2013)
and that private enterprises have emerged as the dominant source of invention patents
(Huang, 2010), our study enriches the literature by examining the interactions between
corporate governance and the more organic innovative activities that are present in small
and medium private Chinese ﬁrms. Second, by focusing on China, we test the boundaries
of important claims in the corporate governance literature (Tsui, 2006), and extend the ex-
isting literature on corporate governance and innovation that focuses mainly on developed
countries (Belloc, 2012). Third, we add to the research on innovation in China, which so
far emphasizes the role of inputs to the innovation process (Jeﬀerson et al, 2006; Sun and
Du, 2010), by highlighting corporate governance as a potentially important determinant
of innovation in ﬁrms.
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2 The Zhejiang Data
The data used in this paper come from a survey of ﬁrms in Zhejiang province which
plays an important role in China’s economy. In 2010, Zhejiang’s population (52 million)
accounted for 3.9% of the national total, but its GDP (402 billion US dollars) accounted for
6.8% of China’s GDP2. The GDP per head of Zhejiang is 7,690 dollars, signiﬁcantly higher
than the national average of 4,384. Among all provinces in 2010, the disposable income
for urban residents and rural residents of Zhejiang ranked 3rd and 1st, respectively. The
fraction of R&D expenditure in Zhejiang’s GDP was 1.82% in 2010, slightly higher than the
national ﬁgure of 1.75%. However, it appears R&D expenditure in Zhejiang is especially
productive, as patent grants to applicants in Zhejiang in 2010 (114,600) accounted for
14.1% of the national total.
What truly distinguishes Zhejiang from other provinces is that Zhejiang’s economy
is highly market-oriented, and it boasts a private sector which is arguably the most vibrant
and developed in China. For instance, 82% of enterprises in Zhejiang are non-state-owned
(Gu and Jiang, 2011). Coincidently, non-state-owned enterprises accounted for 83% of
industrial output in Zhejiang. One key aspect underlying Zhejiang’s strong private sector
is therefore entrepreneurship. As a province with relatively poor natural endowments,
entrepreneurship is understood to play an important role in Zhejiang’s economic success
(Economist, 2011). Therefore, Zhejiang constitutes an ideal context for studying private
enterprise in China.
The survey from which this paper’s data are obtained was carried out by the As-
sociation of Private Enterprises of Zhejiang Provincial Administration for Industry and
Commerce (Zhejiangsheng Gongshangju Siying Qiye Xiehui) in 2007. The survey collected
2Unless speciﬁed otherwise, the ﬁgures in this paragraph and the next are ob-
tained from Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on the 2010 Na-
tional Economic and Social Development, and Statistical Communique of the Zhejiang
Province on the 2010 National Economic and Social Development. The urls for the com-
muniques are http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20110228 402705692.htm and
http://www.zhejiang.gov.cn/gb/zjnew/node3/node22/node170/node406/node6083/userobject9ai122219.html.
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data on ﬁrm performances, IT investment, innovation, compensation practices, corporate
governance practices, the characteristics of the chair of the board (usually the largest
owner) for three years (2004, 2005 and 2006). Most ﬁrms covered were privately owned
and in manufacturing industries. In some of our regressions, we exclude the SOEs, which
account for less than 4% of the ﬁrms in our sample, because SOEs often receive favorable
ﬁnancing from banks, and they also beneﬁt from government grants for R&D. A total of
2400 surveys were sent and about 1920 were returned. Among the 1920 returned surveys,
about 800 were nearly completed. To verify the data quality, six survey workers called the
ﬁrms and requested that ﬁrm employees redo the surveys.
After comparing data from the 800 surveys initially returned to the data collected
from phone calls, they found 95% of the data entries were consistent. Therefore, we con-
clude the quality of the surveys is high. We limit our sample to manufacturing ﬁrms,
leaving us with a total of 909 ﬁrms. In the actual statistical analysis, other ﬁrms are ex-
cluded as they report missing values on some variables included in our regression analysis.
In the end, our regression analysis involves an unbalanced panel of 370 ﬁrms and 725 ﬁrm-
year observations. As noted, private ﬁrms constitute 86% of our sample. Applying the
2011 deﬁnitions of small and medium enterprises in China to our 2004 sample, 56% of the
ﬁrms are small enterprises, and 96% of the ﬁrms are small and medium-sized enterprises
3 Hypothesis
Innovation, deﬁned as the development of a new product or a production process, has
two important features. First, innovation often requires team production. That is, it
requires inputs from multiple parties. These parties can include the owner of physical
capital, managers and workers who provide the human capital, and the ﬁnancial sector
that provides the ﬁnancing. Because the investment of these inputs is often speciﬁc to the
innovative project and irreversible, there are incentives for various parties to engage in self-
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serving behavior which can undermine the project (the “hold-up” problem). For instance,
after R&D workers have performed speciﬁed lab experiments and produced results, there
may be disputes over the ownership and subsequent use of the intellectual property. In
order for successful team production to occur, a mechanism is required to coordinate the
interests of diﬀerent parties. Second, the outcome of innovative activities is uncertain, but
the individuals involved in innovation are often risk-averse. In particular, individuals who
have little ability to reduce risk through diversiﬁcation will be more risk-averse. Managers
and workers may therefore prefer less risk-intensive R&D investment because they strongly
dislike the income ﬂuctuations associated with the outcome of the eﬀort. To encourage the
level of risk-taking which is eﬃcient for the team, these individuals need to be properly
motivated.
Although individuals and non-proﬁt organizations also engage in innovative activ-
ities, ﬁrms are an important source of innovation. This is because they provide as a
partial solution to the innovation problem by coordinating team production, and oﬀer-
ing incentives for innovation (Ho¨lmstrom, 1979, 1982; Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom, 1994).
By shaping the coordination and incentive mechanisms, corporate governance, deﬁned as
ways in which a company is controlled and run, can play an important role in ﬁrm innova-
tion. It oﬀers a way to reduce the kinds of opportunism which threaten the innovation and
also establishes incentives necessary to foster innovation (Belloc 2012). The governance
of a ﬁrm is shaped by both external factors, such as laws and the market for corporate
control, and the internal design of the ﬁrm, such as the distribution of control rights and
compensation. Because our sample of ﬁrms in Zhejiang arguably face the same external
corporate governance environment, in this paper we will focus three important dimensions
of internal corporate governance: the board of directors, ownership concentration, and
whether the CEO is hired from outside.
The board of directors is at the heart of corporate governance structure because it
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has a number of important functions (Fama, 1980; Adams et al, 2010). First, the board
of director can align the interests of management with those of shareholders (Fama and
Jensen, 1983) through the hiring, ﬁring, and assessment of management (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin, 2005). Second, the board of directors can provide access to
important external resources for the ﬁrm (Williamson, 1988; Pfeﬀer and Salancik, 2003).
Third, the board guides the strategies of a ﬁrm (Mace, 1971; Baysinger and Hoskisson,
1990; Demb et al, 1992), including those related to innovation (Baysinger et al, 1991).
A board with more directors is likely to perform these functions better. First, larger
boards are able to provide the resources and expertise to perform more and better monitor-
ing that are demanded by the regulators or the general public (Linck et al, 2008). Second,
a larger number of directors allow the ﬁrm to potentially access a larger pool of external
resources, including technological and ﬁnancial resources that are critical for innovation.
In addition, from the perspective of stakeholder theory, a larger board can accommodate
more stakeholders in innovation, such as key scientists, whose inﬂuence may lead to more
innovation eﬀorts (Lacetera, 2001; Adams et al, 2010). For the SMEs in Zhejiang that we
study ownership is highly concentrated, with the mean holding of the largest shareholder
being 56.4%. Because of this concentration in ownership, these ﬁrms are less likely to suﬀer
from the problems of insuﬃcient monitoring and managerial deviation from the innovation
policy of the owner that can occur in ﬁrms with dispersed ownership. However, because
private SMEs in China in general lack the same access to various innovation-related re-
sources as state-owned enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises, the resource-providing
function of the board will be important for these ﬁrms’ innovation performance. Therefore,
we hypothesize:
H1a. Innovation performance increases with board size.
As outsider or independent directors become more dominant in developed countries,
particularly in the US after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, they are now an important
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factor in corporate governance (Fich, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Lehn et al, 2009;
Linck et al, 2009). Although the current Company Law of China (the 2006 version)
does not require companies to appoint independent directors, the regulatory authorities
recognize and promote the use of independent directors. In particular, since 2001 all
companies listed in mainland China are required to have independent directors and the
number of independent directors must account for at least 1/3 of the board. In our
sample in which there are almost no listed ﬁrms, 48% of the ﬁrm-year observations report
the appointment of independent directors.
Independent directors play two important roles in a company. First, because of their
independence, they are better positioned to monitor management (Rosenstein and Wyatt,
1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Coles et al, 2001; Peng, 2004). Second, they provide
access to external resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Peng, 2004). Again, the second
function is likely to be more important for the SMEs in our sample that have concentrated
ownership. In general, diﬀerent types of independent directors, such as bankers, venture
capitalists, and politically-connected appointees, can bring diﬀerent assets to the company
or represent important stakeholders (Adams et al, 2010). In China, for instance, companies
sometimes appoint current and former government oﬃcials as independent directors for
networking purposes (Peng, 2004; Tian and Lau, 2001). Consequently, we hypothesize:
H1b. Innovation performance is stronger for ﬁrms with independent directors.
Some countries, including China, have two-tier board systems (Maassen and van den
Bosch, 1999; Melis, 2002; Franks et al, 2006). In China, the Company Law requires limited-
liability companies to have a two-tier board. A supervisory board is supposed to monitor
the board of directors (Peng, 2004; Lin, 2004; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). The Company Law
also stipulate that members of the board of directors and senior managers cannot serve as
members of the supervisory boards, and at least 1/3 of the supervisory board members
must be representatives of employees. Besides the function of monitoring, under the
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personnel requirements for supervisory boards in China, a supervisory board can also serve
the company by bringing in resources through the appointment of appropriate external
persons. In addition, a supervisory board can provide representation to employees, an
important group of stake holders within the company.
In practice, the supervisory directors often have low status and limited power. Com-
pared to Germany where the supervisory boards are the ﬁrst-tier boards, the supervisory
boards in China are considered as second-tier boards with limited capacity (Kaplan, 1994;
Dahya et al, 2003; Xiao et al, 2004). Therefore, supervisory boards in China are likely
to be less eﬀective in monitoring the board of directors and the management. However,
based on the functions of attracting potential external resources and oﬀering stake-holder
representation, we hypothesize:
H1c. Innovation performance is stronger for ﬁrms with a supervisory board.
Concentration in ownership can lead to more eﬀective monitoring of management
because the gain from such monitoring is large for block owners. In contrast, when owner-
ship is diﬀuse, each shareholder has little incentive to monitor the management, because
the beneﬁt is small relative to cost (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Consequently, diﬀuse ownership allows managers to engage in activities other than
the inherently-risky innovation activities, while concentrated ownership may promote such
activities (Hill and Snell, 1988; Baysinger et al, 1991).
In addition, concentration in ownership promotes commitment because it is hard for
the large shareholders to exit the ﬁrm (Mayer, 1997). Consequently, large shareholders
are more likely to engage in long-term and risky R&D projects. In other words, capital
becomes patient allowing large shareholders to develop long-term relationships with the
various stakeholders required for innovation (Driver and Guedes, 2012). At the same
time, such long-term owners may also have better access to ﬁnancing if they can establish
a reputation for long run success (Miozzo and Dewick, 2002).
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However, the eﬀects of ownership concentration on innovation are likely to be non-
linear (Lee, 2005). Fundamentally, a large controlling-shareholder can have two opposing
eﬀects on ﬁrm innovation (and performance in general): commitment and entrenchment
(Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). Commitment, as discussed above, leads to patient capital and
support for long run innovation. Entrenchment, however, works against innovation. There
are multiple channels through which entrenched controlling-shareholders can act oppor-
tunistically in ways that limit innovation. They may hire unqualiﬁed individuals related
to the controlling-shareholder (Faccio et al, 2001; Morck and Yeung, 2004; Su et al, 2008;
Young et al, 2008), engage in self-beneﬁting transactions (Barclay and Holderness, 1989,
1991; Barclay et al, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and
Rivkin, 2000), and invest less in R&D and innovation than the optimal level (Backman,
1999; Young et al, 2008). If controlling-shareholders can easily beneﬁt from expropriation,
they are less likely to support innovative activities in the company. In China where the
legal protection for property rights is weak, the expropriation of small shareholders by
controlling-shareholders is particularly a realistic concern (Chen et al, 2011).
A concentrated owner in China is also likely to reduce innovation eﬀorts because
of risk-aversion. Because ﬁnancial markets are less developed in China, the concentrated
owners in the SMEs often have a substantial portion of their personal wealth locked in the
ﬁrms they own and cannot diversify optimally their portfolio to reduce risk. Consequently,
the concentrated owner will exhibit more risk-aversion than a diversiﬁed investor (Heugens
et al, 2009), and avoid risky investment in innovation. Such risk-aversion will be more
pronounced at a higher level of ownership concentration. Overall, because ownership
concentration in China encourages commitment but also entails entrenchment and risk-
aversion at high level of concentration, we hypothesize
H2. Innovation at ﬁrst increases with ownership concentration, but ultimately
the positive eﬀect weakens.
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The agency-based theory of corporate governance generally suggests that the posi-
tions of CEO and Chair of the board should be separate Combining the positions (CEO-
duality), it is argued, compromises the ability of the board to monitor the running of the
ﬁrm (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Coles et al, 2001), because the
single person can appoint friendly directors and stymie the ﬂow of information (Westphal
and Zajac, 1995; Monks and Minow, 2012). When the CEO and chairman are diﬀerent
persons, the boards of directors tend to be more independent and more eﬀective in moni-
toring management (Mallette and Fowler, 1992), and ﬁrm performance tends to be better
(Rechner and Dalton, 1991). This view is not universal, as stewardship theory argues that
the separation between CEO and chairman may prevent unity and eﬃciency in decision
making (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).
The empirical literature on the eﬀects of CEO-duality in developed countries has
produced mixed evidence, with positive eﬀects (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein
and D’Aveni, 1994), negative eﬀects (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Mallette and Fowler,
1992), and insigniﬁcant results (Coles et al, 2001) reported. The evidence from China on
this issue is also mixed (Peng et al, 2007, p.209). However, one result that does emerge
from Song, Song et al (2006) and Peng et al (2007) is that the performance eﬀects of
combining the positions is positive for ﬁrms with a high level of state ownership, and
negative for ﬁrms with a low level of state ownership. In SOEs, the chair and the CEO are
both career-minded agents in the large state-centered hierarchy that includes government
agencies and SOEs. In the hierarchy, the state is often unable or unwilling to specify
well-deﬁned objectives against which agents can be evaluated objectively. In order to gain
promotion to better positions in other SOEs or the government, high-ranking oﬃcials in
SOEs may engage in non-cooperative behaviors designed to foster their career progression.
When the positions of Chair and CEO are separated, such behavior can harm coordination
and eﬃciency in the organization. Therefore, in ﬁrms with dominant state ownership,
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the combination of the positions of Chair and CEO is valuable because it limits internal
competition among senior executives and improves coordination and eﬃciency in decision-
making.
However, in the case of our sample, the Chair is usually the largest shareholder
in a highly-concentrated private ﬁrm. Thus, there is little ambiguity about who holds
the ultimate power in the ﬁrm, and the CEO is unlikely to disregard the will of the
owner in decision-making. Hence, the coordination and eﬃciency advantages of combining
the Chair and CEO positions is not necessarily present for SMEs with low or no state
ownership. Nevertheless, consistent with the general case of Asia (Van Essen et al., 2012),
the founders of the company in our sample are often the concentrated owners and Board
Chairs, and they or their direct relatives serve as the CEO. We argue that when the levels
of (private) ownership concentration are high, and when CEO-duality is present investing
in R&D becomes relatively less appealing, because the concentrated owners have both
incentive and ability to expropriate the minority owners to increase their personal wealth
and beneﬁts. An external CEO can mitigate the expropriation of the minority owners
and direct more resources to innovation. In addition, while CEO-duality may promote the
interests of the family, it may limit the beneﬁts from hiring the best available professional
managers that can be particularly large for SMEs. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
H3. Hiring outsider CEOs promotes innovation activity in privately owned
ﬁrms.3
3It would be interesting to determine whether the eﬀects of an external CEO on innovation diﬀer between
SOEs and other ﬁrms by interacting a dummy variable for external CEOs with a dummy variable for SOEs.
However, in our sample only one SOE ﬁrm separates the positions of chair and CEO. Consequently, we




The dependent variables are the number of new invention patents of a ﬁrm between 2004
and 2006, and new product sales of a ﬁrm in each year. The former is a measure that
will include both product and process innovations, most likely of a technical nature. New
products obviously do not include process innovations. A ﬁrm can acquire the designation
of new products for some of its products through certiﬁcation by central government or
provincial governments. The new product sales measure the market success of a ﬁrm’s
innovation activity.
The independent variables are the size of the board, an indicator for whether a ﬁrm
has independent directors, an indicator for whether a ﬁrm has a supervisory board, the
shareholding of the largest shareholder, an indicator for whether the CEO is an outsider.
We deﬁne a CEO as an outsider if s/he is not the largest shareholder or a relative of the
largest shareholder. We refer to the ﬁrst three variables as the board-related governance
variables.
Control variables include the log of R&D expenditures, the fraction of senior man-
agers who are subject to performance-based pay, log assets, log age of ﬁrms, and sector
dummies. These are all well established in the innovation literature. We include the
performance-based pay incentive for senior managers because may provide incentive for
innovation. Log assets and the age of ﬁrm control for the eﬀects the size and experience
in production.
In all regressions, we include an indicator or indicators for past innovation activities
to control for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity in innovation. For the patent equations, we
use the stock of invention patents in 2004. In the regressions for new product sales, we
use the number of patents in the same year and the one year lag of new product sales.
We include dummies to represent ﬁve major industrial groups to account for sector het-
15
erogeneity. Because we already use indicators of past innovation to control for unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity in the regressions, we do not include dummies for more disaggregated
industries to preserve degrees of freedom.
4.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The number of new invention patents is always non-negative. If a ﬁrm’s innovation eﬀorts
are not successful, it will report zero new invention patents. Between 2004 and 2006,
75.4% of ﬁrms do not report an increase in the number of patents owned. Because patents
are a non-negative count variable, we estimate two models of patents, the Poisson model,
and a Probit-Poisson hurdle model.
The Poisson model is:





where 푓 is the Poisson function, 푋 is the vector of independent and control variables for
ﬁrm 푖 as detailed in subsection 4.1, and 훽 is the vector of parameters. Since patenting
usually lags the initial innovation eﬀorts, in (1), we follow Lerner and Wulf (2007) to
specify that independent and control variables in 2004 are related to new patents between
2004 and 2006.
The Poisson model assumes that the arrival of patents are independent events, hence
the probability for a ﬁrm with zero patents to obtain the ﬁrst patent is the same as the
probability for a ﬁrm with ﬁve patents to obtain the sixth patent. Like many other produc-
tive activities, it is plausible that there exists learning-by-doing in innovation. For a ﬁrm
without a patent, obtaining the ﬁrst one through innovation is a substantial achievement.
Once the ﬁrm has the ﬁrst patent, the innovation experience gained can help the ﬁrm in
further innovation, making future patents easier to obtain. Consequently, the stochastic
process governing whether a ﬁrm obtains positive patents or not and the process govern-
ing the amount of patents conditional on a positive patent count can be diﬀerent. To
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allow for the diﬀerence, we estimate a Probit-Poisson hurdle model. In the ﬁrst part of
the hurdle model, we estimate a Probit model in which the chance of obtaining positive
patents depend on the independent variables and control variables





where Φ is the density function for a normal distribution, 푋 is the same vector of variables
as in equation (1), and 훾 is the vector of parameters. Once a ﬁrm overcomes the innovation
“hurdle” to obtain a positive patent count, we assume that conditional on 푋, the number
of patents follows a truncated Poisson distribution. That is, the second part of the hurdle
model is





where 푔 is the distribution function for a zero-truncated Poisson distribution, 푋 is the
same vector of variables as in equation (1), and 훿 is the vector of parameters.
One important issue in estimating the eﬀects of governance on innovation is unob-
served ﬁrm heterogeneity, which can potentially lead to biased estimates. For instance,
if a ﬁrm has accumulated valuable knowhow and experience in innovation, it is likely to
choose endogenously to increase R&D inputs and adopt suitable corporate governance
practices to boost innovation output. If such an initial advantage is not accounted for, an
econometrician will overestimate the eﬀect of R&D inputs and corporate governance on
innovation by attributing the eﬀect of initial advantage in innovation to R&D inputs and
corporate governance.
In general, the inclusion of random eﬀects or ﬁxed eﬀects can mitigate the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity in estimations based on panel data. Random eﬀects can account
for ﬁrm heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with the included independent and control
variables. In linear regressions, ﬁxed eﬀects can control for unobserved heterogeneity that
is constant and correlated with independent and control variables. Unfortunately, ﬁxed
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eﬀects cannot be included in the Probit, Poisson or Tobit models, because the nonlinearity
in these models prevents identiﬁcation and consistent estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects.
The speciﬁcation in equations (1) through (3) reduces our dataset to a simple cross-
section, preventing us from including random eﬀects. We control for unobserved ﬁrm
heterogeneity by including the stock of patents in 2004. The idea is, if a ﬁrm has an initial
advantage in innovation, it should be captured by the number of patents in 2004.
The other dependent variable, new product sales, is also a non-negative variable and
takes continuous values. In our sample, in 2004, 2005, and 2006, the percentages of ﬁrms
who report zero new product sales are 52.9%, 47.6%, and 45.7%. Because the new product
sale is a non-negative continuous variable, we estimate two models, the conventional Type
I Tobit model and the Lognormal hurdle Model.
To be speciﬁc, the conventional Type I Tobit model, augmented with random eﬀects,
is
푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠∗푖,푡 = 푋
′
푖,푡휁 + 푢푖 + 푒푖,푡 (4)
where 푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠∗푖,푡 the latent measure of market success of innovation for ﬁrm 푖
in period 푡, 푋 is the vector of independent and control variables described in subsection
4.1, 휁 is the vector of parameters, 푢푖 is a ﬁrm speciﬁc random eﬀect, and 푒푖푡 is the error
term. As discussed in subsection 4.1, 푋푖,푡 includes the number of patents in the same year
and the one-year lag of new product sale. We only observe the 푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠∗푖,푡 when
it is positive:
푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠푖,푡 = 푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠
∗
푖,푡 푖푓 푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠
∗
푖,푡 > 0
푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠∗푖,푡 = 0 푖푓 푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠
∗
푖,푡 ≤ 0
As noted in Wooldridge (2001), the Tobit model is restrictive in the sense that the
same stochastic process governs whether we observe positive new product sale, and the
amount of new product sale. For instance, the marginal eﬀect of a variable on whether we
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observe new product sale and the marginal eﬀect of the same variable on the amount of
new product sale, must have the same sign. In our application, to report any new product
sales, a ﬁrm must invest signiﬁcantly in R&D. However, when the new product is created,
the actual sales amount is more likely to be inﬂuenced by the eﬀorts of sales personnel.
In general, the processes for creating and marketing new products need not be the same.
The eﬀects of corporate governance in these two processes can be diﬀerent as well. To
allow for diﬀerent processes of developing and marketing new products, we estimate the
Lognormal hurdle model, which is a hurdle model for nonnegative continuous variables.
The ﬁrst part of the Lognormal hurdle model speciﬁes a Probit model in which
whether we observe positive new product sale depends on the vector of variables 푋:





where Φ is the density function for a normal distribution, 푋 is the same vector of variables
as in equation (4), and 휂 is the vector of parameters. For the second part of the Lognormal
hurdle model, we estimate a log-normal model for observations with positive new product
sale amount
푛푒푤 푝푟표푑푢푐푡 푠푎푙푒푠푖,푡 = exp
(
(푋 ′푖,푡휃 + 푣푖,푡
)
(6)
where푋 is the same vector of variables as in equation (4), and 휃 is the vector of parameters,
and 푣푖푡 is an error term following a normal distribution.
4.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the sample means, standard deviations, and the correlation matrix of the
key variables. For all variables other than new invention patents, we compute the statistics
for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 combined. For new invention patents, we calculate the
change in patents owned for each ﬁrm between 2004 and 2006.
On average, a ﬁrm in the sample has 1.15 invention patents. The average increase
in patents owned between 2004 and 2006 was 0.85. The average annual new product
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sales were 34.98 million yuan, while R&D expenditures were 4.22 million . The largest
shareholder owned on average 58.64% of the shares of the ﬁrms, indicating a high level of
ownership concentration in the medium and small enterprises. In the sample, 48% of the
ﬁrms had independent directors, 74% had a supervisory board, and the average size of the
board was about 4 directors. In only 9% of the observations did we observe that ﬁrms hired
outsider CEOs. About 58.82% of managers are subject to performance-based pay. The
ﬁrms are relative young, as the average age was about 10 years. Most of the ﬁrms are small
or medium-sized, with an average asset level of 171.91 million yuan. Most of the ﬁrms
are private and domestically owned. Only about 4% of ﬁrms are State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs), and about 9% are fully or partially Foreign-Owned Enterprises (FOEs).
4.4 Regression Results for Invention Patents
Column (1) of Table 2 presents the Poisson model for new invention patents. Columns
(2) and (3) present the ﬁrst part (Probit) and second part (zero-truncated Poisson) of
the Probit-Poisson hurdle model. The coeﬃcients are the marginal eﬀects of the right-
hand-side variables on the dependent variables, evaluated at the sample mean. The log-
likelihood reported in column (3) is the combined log-likelihood of the two parts of re-
gressions (presented in columns (2) and (3)). The same applies to the log-likelihood in
column (6). Because the values of log-likelihood in columns (3) and (6) are higher than
those in columns (1) and (3), respectively, the Probit-Poisson model and the lognormal
hurdle model appear to ﬁt the data better than the Poisson model and the Tobit model,
respectively.
In H1, we argue that board size, presence of independent directors, and the supervi-
sory board have positive eﬀects on innovation (here measured by new invention patents).
As shown in columns (1) through (3) of Table 2, both the Poisson model and the Probit-
Poisson hurdle model indicate that the board size variable is always insigniﬁcant. There-
fore, the results do not support H1a (the positive eﬀects of board size). In the ﬁrst column
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(1) of Table 2, the Poisson model reports a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on indepen-
dent directors. However, the positive eﬀect of independent directors becomes insigniﬁcant
in the Probit-Poisson model in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. The results provide limited
support for H1b (the positive eﬀects of independent directors). From the ﬁrst two columns
of Table 2, in both the Possion model and the Probit part of the Probit-Poisson model,
the supervisory board variable has a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on invention. This
represents evidence against H1c.
Regarding ownership concentration, we hypothesize in H2 that its eﬀect on new
invention patents is initially positive but becomes weaker at higher levels of concentration.
To test this hypothesis on ownership concentration (measured by the shares owned by the
largest shareholder), we specify its eﬀect on patenting as piece-wise linear. To implement
this speciﬁcation, we include the variable shares owned by the largest shareholder (labeled
largest sh % in Table 2) and its interaction with a dummy variable indicating the shares
owned by the largest shareholder is greater than 29% (labeled high concentration dummy
in Table 2). We choose the threshold of 29% because this threshold value generates
the highest log-likelihood value among the whole range of possible threshold values. In
unreported regressions, we estimated a quadratic speciﬁcation for ownership concentration,
which results in a lower log-likelihood. In the ﬁrst column of Table 2, when the ownership
concentration level is below 29%, the marginal eﬀect of ownership concentration, which
equals the coeﬃcient on largest sh %, is 0.06 and statistically signiﬁcant. This implies
if the share held by the largest owner increases by 10%, the number of new invention
patents will increase by 0.6. When ownership concentration exceed 29%, its eﬀect is equal
to 0.01, which is the sum of the coeﬃcients on the variable largest sh % and the interaction
term labeled high concentration dummy ⋅largest sh %. Although this eﬀect of ownership
concentration above the 29% threshold is still positive and statistically signiﬁcant, it is
markedly lower than the eﬀect of ownership concentration below the threshold. When we
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switch to the Probit-Poisson hurdle model, we observe the same pattern in columns (2)
and (3) in Table 2, although the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant in column (2). Overall, the
results oﬀer support for H2.
The last hypothesis, H3, argues that hiring an external CEO will enhance innovation
by restricting the entrenchment eﬀect of a dominant shareholder in private ﬁrms. In the
ﬁrst two columns of Table 2, the coeﬃcient on outsider CEO is insigniﬁcant. But it
becomes marginally signiﬁcant (with a p-value of 0.053) in the second part of the Probit-
Poisson hurdle model. The regression results weakly support H3.
To check whether our results are driven by the SOEs or FOEs, we drop these ﬁrms
from the regressions and report the results in columns (1) through (3) in Table 3. The
results are very similar to those in columns (1) and (3) in Table 2, respectively. In column
(1) in Table 2, we also include dummy variables for SOEs and FOEs.4 These dummy
variables are always insigniﬁcant. Overall, we conclude our results are not sensitive to the
inclusion of SOEs and FOEs in the sample.
When we use patents as the measure for innovation, we see that H1c, H2, and H3
receive support of diﬀerent degrees, while H1a has no support and H1b is rejected. That
supervisory board has a negative eﬀect on patenting, contrary to H1b, is surprising. Based
on private conversations the authors had with entrepreneurs in Zhejiang, the entrepreneurs
tend to believe the supervisory board should have no eﬀect because the status of the
supervisory board is low.
4.5 Regression Results for New Product Sales
An alternative measure of innovation is new product sales, a measure widely used in
previous studies of China (e.g. Li et al, 2010a). To see if corporate governance has the
same eﬀects on new product sales as on new invention patents, we estimate the Type I
4In columns (2) and (3), the SOE dummy is dropped from the regressions by Stata because of perfect
colinearity.
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Tobit model and the Lognormal hurdle model with new product sales as the dependent
variable, parallel to the equations for new invention patents. We present the results
in columns (4) through (6) in Table 2. Column (4) corresponds to the Type I Tobit
model, and columns (5) and (6) are the ﬁrst (Probit) and second part (Lognormal) of
the Lognormal hurdle model. Dropping SOEs and FOEs, we repeat the estimations and
report the results in columns (4) through (6) in Table 3. The coeﬃcients are the marginal
eﬀects of the right-hand-side variables on the dependent variables, evaluated at the sample
mean. Overall, we ﬁnd little evidence that corporate governance variables have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on new product sales. In these regressions, all coeﬃcients on governance variables
are not signiﬁcant, except that the coeﬃcient on external CEO in marginally signiﬁcant
and negative in column (5) of Table 2 and column (5) of Table 3.
5 Summary and Discussion
Starting from a low level of economic development, the Chinese economy has achieved
dramatic growth over the past three decades. Both the accumulation of productive factors
and catch-up in technology contributed to the growth experience. However, as the return
to investment in physical capital diminishes with the build up of the capital stock, and as
more catch-up opportunities have been taken, a high future growth rate is not guaranteed
for the Chinese economy and Chinese ﬁrms. Not surprisingly, Chinese ﬁrms have identiﬁed
innovation as a path to future growth. Following the surge of innovation activities in China
over the past decade, a new literature on innovation in China is expanding. At the same
time, the literature on corporate governance and innovation suggests that ﬁrm governance
aﬀects its innovation performance, at least in developed countries.
We therefore address the question of whether corporate governance aﬀects the in-
novation performance of ﬁrms in the emerging economy of China with a speciﬁc focus on
privately owned SMEs. We study a sample of 370 mostly private and relatively small ﬁrms
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in Zhejiang province, China between 2004 and 2006, using two measures of innovation,
invention patents and new product sales. Overall, and regardless of innovation measure,
we ﬁnd that the innovation process does depend on R&D investments, and that past in-
novation is a good predictor of future innovation. With respect to corporate governance,
we ﬁnd that it matters only for innovation measured by new patents. We ﬁnd relatively
strong evidence that ownership concentration has a non-linear impact on innovation, with
the implication that very high levels of ownership concentration might result in more at-
tention to appropriation of beneﬁts from minority shareholders or other stakeholders than
to innovation activities. At the same time, there is some evidence that having indepen-
dent members of the board and hiring an external CEO positively aﬀects invention patents
granted to the ﬁrms, but board size has no impact. The existence of a supervisory board
is generally negatively related to patenting activity. For the other measure of innovation,
new product sales, we ﬁnd no evidence that our corporate governance measures have any
impact, indicating that more work is required to understand the nature of innovation in
Chinese ﬁrms, and its relationship to corporate governance.
In terms of the literature on corporate governance and innovation, our study makes
three contributions. First, because 86% of the ﬁrms in our sample are private and have no
state or foreign ownership and 96% of the ﬁrms are SMEs, our paper focuses mainly on
innovation in private SMEs whose future success is critical to China’s economic transition
and development. In China, the deliberate eﬀorts of the Chinese government in promoting
innovation, often via the public sector, have not been eﬀective (Breznitz and Murphree,
2011, p.28). Relative to other types of enterprise, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had
lower R&D inputs and outputs (Jeﬀerson et al, 2003). Meanwhile, as the private sector
has become a more important force in China’s economy, private ﬁrms have become the
most important source of China’s innovation Huang (2010). The Chinese government itself
also recognizes the important role of private ﬁrms in innovation (Breznitz and Murphree,
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2011, p.77). Situated in Zhejiang, our study oﬀers a good opportunity to understand
the innovative activities in the most vibrant private Chinese ﬁrms. In this sense, it is
important to note that our results indicate that our sample ﬁrms do indeed innovate, and
that in important respects the determinants of innovation are similar to those observed in
developed countries. In particular, our results suggest that innovative activity is related
to R&D inputs, and that innovative activity is persistent, results consistent with those in
developed countries (Geroski et al, 1997; Ceﬁs and Orsenigo, 2001; Ceﬁs, 2003; Raymond
et al, 2010). Thus, innovation in these ﬁrms is not random. While we have not been
able to establish a strong uniform role for board governance in this process, there is at
least some evidence that it might matter. There is certainly quite strong evidence that
ownership structure matters, particularly for patenting activities.
Second, our result adds to the literature on corporate governance and innovation
by focusing on an emerging market. Current knowledge on corporate governance and in-
novation is based mostly on theory developed in the context of developed countries and
evidence from developed countries Belloc (2012). We argue the many corporate gover-
nance factors should have similar positive eﬀects on innovation in the SMEs in emerging
economies. However, because the SMEs feature both high levels of ownership concen-
tration and restricted obtain external resources, the eﬀects of corporate governance on
innovation are more likely to originate from need to access resources, rather than because
of the need for eﬃcient monitoring. In the business environment of an emerging economy,
if the market institutions and legal system are less supportive innovation, the internal
governance of a ﬁrm will play a more important role in achieving its innovative goals by
pulling together resources and by engaging stakeholders. The empirical ﬁndings in our pa-
per provide only very limited evidence consistent with the literature based on developed
countries suggesting that the relation between corporate governance and innovation may
be somewhat diﬀerent and complex in emerging economies, and will require further study.
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Third, we highlight the role of corporate governance in the innovation process in
China. Existing studies on innovation in China focus on measurable inputs, in particular
R&D (Jeﬀerson et al, 2006; Sun and Du, 2010; Wang and Kafouros, 2009; Li et al, 2010a).
We argue that corporate governance matters because it not only aﬀects the amount of
inputs of innovation available, but the allocation of the inputs, and the eﬃciency in the
use of inputs. Once again, our empirical results provide limited supporting evidence in that
board-related governance measures, ownership concentration, and hiring an external CEO
to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on invention patents but not new product sales. In addition, our
results suggest that supervisory boards at best do not enhance innovative activity. We
note that supervisory boards are required of public companies in China, and so our results
might call into question their eﬃcacy.
Although we ﬁnd that corporate governance has some eﬀect on the number of in-
vention patents, we do not ﬁnd it to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on new product sale, the
alternative measure for innovation in our paper. The insigniﬁcant ﬁndings on new prod-
uct sales are quite surprising. We oﬀer some thoughts on the insigniﬁcant results. First,
invention patents and new product sale are very diﬀerent forms of innovation. Invention
patents likely represent a more radical form of innovation because to be considered for
registration, innovations must be judged to represent a marked improvement over past
patents and knowledge. In contrast, new products are often incremental innovations, be-
cause they can result from modiﬁcation of existing products, and the commercialization
of invention patents. Corporate governance may be better suited to support radical inno-
vation eﬀorts that require strategic, purposefully, and long-term planning. Second, new
product sales are likely to involve more stakeholders, often at the operational level, and
it is hard for the usual corporate governance practices to target these eﬀectively. Besides
the top management team and R&D workers, success in new product sales also requires
inputs from marketing and sales personnel. The governance factors considered in our pa-
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per (the board-related factors, ownership concentration, and hiring an external CEO) are
not meant to provide direct incentives to all involved individuals.
Of course, these remain our speculative thoughts on the relationship between corpo-
rate governance and new product sales. The existing literature does oﬀer some information
about the determination of new product sales. Li et al (2010a) do ﬁnd that spillovers from
foreign ﬁrms contribute to higher new product sales in domestically owned Chinese ﬁrms.
Apparently, future work is needed to understand the determination of invention patents,
the determination of new product sales, and the interactions between the two processes.
The focus of our sample on private SMEs provides interesting insights, but it also
warrants caution in interpreting the results. First, although Zhejiang provides a good
background for the study of private SMEs, it is not the average province in China because
the role of the private sector in Zhejiang is much more signiﬁcant compared to other
provinces. Consequently, our results may not readily extend to private SMEs in other
provinces in China, because private ﬁrms there may face a business environment that is
less friendly to the private sector. However, this also implies there are ample research
opportunities in studying the eﬀects of corporate governance on innovation and other
aspects of ﬁrm performances. For instance, it would be very useful to conduct a systematic
comparison of corporate governance in diﬀerent ownership types in national samples.
As discussed above, further work is required to understand the determination of new
product sales, and what is the relationship between patents and new product sales. This
is important because eventually, innovations must achieve success in market for ﬁrms to
beneﬁt from them. As noted above, the wide availability of new product sales data in China
has caused many researchers to focus on this measure of innovation. Our results suggest
that this may be restrictive, and that more attention should be given to other measures of
innovation activity. Regarding the ﬁnding that the supervisory board has negative eﬀects,
more empirical work would reveal whether it is caused by the idiosyncrasy in our sample,
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or it is a robust general observation.
In general, as China continues to aggressively pursue success in innovation and as
Chinese ﬁrms seek to improve their corporate governance, understanding the relationship
between the two will become more important. This will be particularly true of SMEs, as
they become more important in the Chinese economy.
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s:
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T
h
e
to
p
ro
w
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d
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a
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s
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e
d
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d
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t
v
a
ri
a
b
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.
P
a
te
n
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r
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v
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o
n
p
a
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n
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n
2
0
0
4
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n
d
2
0
0
6
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n
d
N
P
S
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r
to
th
e
n
ew
p
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d
u
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s.
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e
se
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n
d
ro
w
in
d
ic
a
te
s
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
m
et
h
o
d
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
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)
a
n
d
(3
),
th
e
h
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
is
th
e
P
ro
b
it
-P
o
is
so
n
h
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
(5
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a
n
d
(6
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th
e
h
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
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th
e
L
o
g
n
o
rm
a
l
h
u
rd
le
m
o
d
el
.
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n
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)
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g
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o
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r
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o
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u
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o
d
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m
b
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,
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en
ce
co
m
p
a
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b
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e
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g
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ih
o
o
d
v
a
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e
in
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m
n
(1
).
T
h
e
sa
m
e
a
p
p
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e
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g
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o
o
d
v
a
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e
in
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m
n
(6
).
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